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INTRODUCTION
The honeymoon period of the “turn to history” in international law did
not last long.1 On the surface everyone agreed that the past of the discipline
remained under-examined and under-theorized. Additionally, few (if any)
international legal scholars still believed in the most extreme versions of
linear, progressivist narratives that imagined (international) law to be part
and parcel of “the long march of mankind from the cave to the computer.”2
Nevertheless, important methodological differences persisted. These
Senior Lecturer, Australian National University College of Law. I would like to thank Kathryn
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and style remain mine.
1. For some critical overviews: Thomas Skouteris, Engaging History in International Law, in NEW
APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES (Jose Maria
Beneyto & David Kennedy eds., 2012); Matthew Craven, Theorising the Turn to History in
International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Anne Orford
& Florian Hoffman eds., 2016); Valedina Vadi, International Law and its Histories: Methodological
Risks and Opportunities, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 311 (2017).
2. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1(6th ed. 2008).
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disagreements include the nature of historical time and, correspondingly,
the relationship between the present and the past,3 the appropriate and
permissible sources,4 the relationship between contingency and necessity,
agency and structure,5 and aesthetic and theoretical choices between “thick
description” and explanation.6 These deep theoretical divisions and the
increasingly sour tone of the debate make the apparent consensus over the
question of Eurocentrism worthy of closer examination. Simply put,
scholars who agree on little else nonetheless acknowledge that the history
of international law has been profoundly Eurocentric and that correcting
this bias should be one of the main preoccupations of contemporary
historical efforts. In fact, it is not uncommon that battles over other
methodological questions are fought on the terrain of Eurocentrism, a point
to which I will return shortly.
This essay is animated by the suspicion that Eurocentrism has emerged
as an important empty signifier for the history and historiography of
international law. This is not to say that the term is vague or indeterminate,
even though it certainly is that as well. Rather, drawing from Laclau, we
can understand “Eurocentrism” as a point of hegemonic contestation. The
meaning of the term, its implications, and the means for overcoming it have
not acquired yet a stable and discrete content. They are, rather, the
battlefield where different political and jurisprudential projects clash. In
Laclau’s own words:
[T]he universal—taken by itself—is an empty signifier, what
particular content is going to symbolize the latter is something which
cannot be determined either by an analysis of the particular in itself or
of the universal. The relation between the two depends on the context
of the antagonism and it is, in the strict sense of the term, a hegemonic
3. Central to the dispute is, of course, the Orford-Hunter debate centered around the question of
anachronism: Ian Hunter, Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics: On the Critical History of the Law
of Nature and Nations, in LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITISH COLONIAL THOUGHT: TRANSPOSITIONS OF
EMPIRE (Shaunnagh Dorsett & Ian Hunter eds., 2010); Anne Orford, The Past as Law or History? The
Relevance of Imperialism for Modern International Law (University of Melbourne, Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 600, 2012).
4. Rose Parfitt, The Spectre of Sources, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 297 (2014); Susan Pedersen, Back to the
League of Nations, 112 THE AMER. HIST. REV. 1091 (2007) (criticising Anghie’s engagement with the
Mandate System by primarily focusing on his sources, which Pedersen considered to have been out-of-
date, rather than the substance of his argument).
5. The debate is commonly structured around confrontations between Marxist and other, non-Marxian
leftist legal histories, as well as between poststructuralism and structuralism of the Marxist, non-Marxist,
and anti-Marxist varieties: ROBERTO UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY (2004); Susan Marks, False
Contingency, 62 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 1 (2009); Umut Özsu, Agency, Universality, and the
Politics of International Legal History, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 58 (2010); Ingo Venzke, What If? Counter-
factual (Hi)Stories of International Law, (Amsterdam Law School, Research Paper No. 2016-66, 2016);
Justin Desautels-Stein, Structuralist Legal Histories, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (2015).
6. Marxist legal histories being a typical example of the latter category: Christopher Tomlins, Marxist
Legal History, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL HISTORY (Markus D. Dubber & Christopher
Tomlins eds. 2018).
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operation.7
An empty signifier is both the outcome and the point of articulation of an
antagonistic relationship: opposing discourses clash and their
incompatibility becomes evident, as does the impossibility of objective
determination.8 On the contrary, when a discourse achieves hegemonic
status it absorbs its opponents and dictates the meaning of signifiers.
Meaning is, therefore, stabilized through struggle and not thanks to some
inner quality or rationality of any given term. When it comes to law, the
sites of this struggle are diverse and diffuse. Courts, diplomatic conferences,
law reviews, and the streets operate as the theatres of clashes over the
meaning of “sovereignty,” the implications of being “human,” the steps that
are essential for the realization of the “right to self-determination.” Debates
over Eurocentrism are an overwhelmingly academic preoccupation. They
can, nonetheless, inform broader theory and practice and define what is
possible and desirable for international law as a discipline.
If it is true that an unacknowledged battle over the meaning and
implication of “Eurocentrism” is unfolding, then what is at stake is not
simply the clarification of the terms of the debate. More fundamentally, I
am interested in intervening in this debate, retrieving the radical potential
of early critiques of Eurocentrism, and bringing them to bear on
international legal history. To do so, I will proceed in two steps. First, I will
map the ongoing debate as well as the strategies proposed by international
lawyers in order to overcome Eurocentrism. It will become evident that
beneath this apparent consensus lie irreconcilable differences about the
meaning of Eurocentrism, imperialism, and the character of international
law. Secondly, I will revisit Samir Amin’s original articulation and
treatment of the term.9 I will further draw from debates between Marxian
and postcolonial scholars about the potential and limitations of Marxian
concepts to grasp and adequately explain society, domination and social
struggles outside the West. Drawing from Samir Amin’s arguments about
the uniquely capitalist origins of modern Eurocentrism I will then reflect on
contemporary debates about international legal history and anachronism
arguing that contextualist critiques of postcolonial legal histories have
fundamentally misunderstood the purpose and limitations of such
endeavors. Overall, I argue that thinking about Eurocentrism as a culturalist
distortion that is inextricably linked to global capitalist expansion allows us
to discern the role of international law in this irreducibly contradictory
process of globalizing capitalism. Mine is a position that—unlike much
contemporary scholarship—is open about its assumptions, and in doing so
7. ERNESTO LACLAU, EMANCIPATION(S) (2007).
8. Id. at 5.
9. SAMIR AMIN, EUROCENTRISM (2d ed. 2009).
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pushes against efforts to domesticate the critique of Eurocentrism, reducing
it into demands for professional diversity under the hegemony of neoliberal
capitalism.
I. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORY AND THE PERILS OF EUROCENTRISM
Launching his scathing critique against Anthony Anghie in particular,
and critical and postcolonial histories of the law of nations in general, Ian
Hunter anchored his objections to a critique of Eurocentrism. For Hunter,
critical international legal historians are trapped within a profoundly
Eurocentric theoretical universe that assumes a single moral framework for
both, say, Māori conceptions of land-belonging and English claims for
settlement.10 In fact, he argues that by assuming such a universal framework
critical historians enact their own Eurocentric assumptions. In Hunter’s text
this embrace of Eurocentrism is a failure so compelling as not to require
further explanation:
In treating early modern jus naturae et gentium as the ideological
origin of modern—state-centered, imperialist—international law,
critical historiography grounds its critique of jus gentium particularism
or regionality on social-theoretic and philosophical premises tacitly
assumed to be universal. It is highly likely, though, that the theoretical
and philosophical premises of this critique are themselves European-
specific—that is, accessible only to those iteratively trained in an array
of regional university-based European intellectual cultures.11
For now, I am not interested in discussing the substance of Hunter’s
argument nor whether thinking about 18th century intellectual production
in terms of Eurocentrism is itself—paradoxically—anachronistic. Rather, I
want to make strange something very familiar to everyone in the field of
international legal history: Eurocentrism is a common and effective charge
against one’s intellectual opponents. Correspondingly, successfully
detecting and avoiding it operates as a shared measure of the scholarly
quality and/or political worthiness of new scholarly pursuits. As I show in
this section, this common vocabulary and ambition carry wildly divergent
meanings. These divergences persist because “Eurocentrism” has become
the terrain of political confrontation within the discipline. Different
historiographical, juridical, and political projects are in competition over
authoritatively determining the meaning and consequences of
“Eurocentrism.” As long as no approach scores a decisive victory, the term
remains open-ended, and no amount of technically impeccable scholarly
work can concretize its meaning. This section offers a snapshot of these
differences, without advocating for or arguing against one specific approach
10. Hunter, supra note 3, at 25.
11. Id. at 13.
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for the time being.
Take, for example, the Oxford Handbook of the History of International
Law.12 Of all possible goals, its editors identified confrontation with
Eurocentrism as their primary commitment and organizing principle. For
them, if Eurocentrism is the problem, it is because it leads to “incomplete”
histories of the discipline:
The Eurocentric story of international law has proven wrong because
it is incomplete. Not only does it generally ignore the violence,
ruthlessness, and arrogance which accompanied the dissemination of
Western rules, and the destruction of other legal cultures in which that
dissemination resulted. Like most other histories, this history of
international law was a history of conquerors and victors, not of the
victims. Furthermore, the conventional story ignores too many other
experiences and forms of legal relations between autonomous
communities developed in the course of history. It even discards such
extra-European experiences and forms which were discontinued as a
result of domination and colonization by European Powers as
irrelevant to a (continuing) history of international law.13
A particular version of global history is put forward as the solution. More
specifically, the incorporation of multiple perspectives, an emphasis on new
actors, and a certain anti-statist sensibility are identified as ways of
“provincializing Europe.”14 This experiment was met with more than a little
skepticism. A review symposium hosted by the European Journal of
International Law found the initiative to be ambitious but ultimately
unsuccessful. Critics focused on the uncritical reproduction of international
legal sources that makes histories irreducibly statist regardless of a potential
“global” outlook,15 the limited and limiting engagement with Islamic law as
law,16 and a certain “mild center-left” political commitment that rendered
issues of economic exploitation and global capitalism invisible.17 I will
return to this last point shortly, since it captures something important about
the way critiques of Eurocentrism are framed in the disciplinary debate. For
now, it is worth noting that this distinction between seeing Eurocentrism as
a matter of perspective and/or completeness and seeing it as a matter of
conceptualization and/or theoretical orientation is an unacknowledged but
important one.
12. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Berdo Fassbender & Anne
Peters eds., 2012).
13. Berdo Fassbender and Anne Peters, Introduction: Towards a Global History of International Law,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 1-2.
14. Id. at 9.
15. See Parfitt, supra note 4.
16. Nahed Samour, Is There a Role for Islamic International Law in the History of International Law?,
25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 313 (2014).
17. Anne-Charlotte Martineau, Overcoming Eurocentrism? Global History and the Oxford Handbook
of the History of International Law, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 329, 330 (2014).
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Allow me to elaborate the significance of this distinction. Bringing the
contributions of non-Western international lawyers to the discipline of
international law into the spotlight is undeniably a much-needed task.
Nevertheless, such initiatives do not necessarily mean that these additional
contributions question the core concepts of international law, such as a
binary and exclusionary understanding of “sovereignty,” a fixed and reified
understanding of “territory,” or a hierarchical and exclusionary
understanding of the “human.” An approach that questions Eurocentrism
exclusively by showing that non-Westerners also became competent users
of the language of international law ends up implying that the language
itself is truly universal, even if it originated in Europe.18 On the contrary,
critical histories of international law go beyond the origins of the discipline
or the identity and geographical representativeness of its practitioners.
Rather, critical legal scholars have strived to show that some of the
discipline’s core concepts and arguments not only incorporate Western
ideas about the world but also support the material interests of imperialist
centers, even if the composition of the profession has diversified. Either side
yields the language of Eurocentrism to criticize the other. However, neither
concede that their understandings of Eurocentrism diverge significantly. If
we did so, the power of accusations about Eurocentrism would
automatically diminish. The term would cease to operate as the focal point
of superficial consensus and would, therefore, not interpellate the opposing
camp effectively.
However, disciplinary differences will not disappear if we refuse to talk
about them. If we read carefully, these unacknowledged differences become
visible. Arnulf Becker Lorca, for instance, has put forward a particular
conception of what Eurocentrism is and what it does in the history of
international law. For him, Eurocentrism produces a particular type of
distortion that erases peripheral and semi-peripheral international lawyers
and their progressive contributions to the evolution of international law.19
Accordingly, Becker Lorca’s broader contribution is centered around
shedding light on the struggles and victories of such semi-peripheral
lawyers. Latin American, Greek, Ottoman/Turkish, Japanese and Chinese
international lawyers-his argument goes-fundamentally transformed 19th-
century international law making it more responsive to the needs and
aspirations of their polities.20 He argues that histories that focus on the
fundamentally imperialist character of international law perpetuate the
18. See, e.g., Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Idea of European International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L.
315 (2006).
19. Arnulf Becker Lorca, Eurocentrism in the History of International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, at 1035.
20. SeeArnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century. Histories of Imposition
and Appropriation, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. at 475 (2010); ARNULF BECKER LORCA, MESTIZO
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 1842-1933 (2014).
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Eurocentric distortion by downplaying the agency and influence of
international lawyers outside the West.21 For him, international law’s
Eurocentrism needs to be confronted in the terrain of intellectual history, in
order to show the rich contributions and original legal thinking of semi-
peripheral lawyers. At the same time, Becker Lorca acknowledges the
active participation and intellectual as well as material embeddedness of
these semi-peripheral lawyers in projects of state and capitalist expansion
coupled with genocidal violence against Indigenous peoples, but he swiftly
separates them from the main historiographical effort and relegates them to
parenthetical status.22
However, it is precisely international law’s complicity with Indigenous
dispossession, statism, capitalist expansion, and racist domination that form
the heart of post-colonial critiques of Eurocentrism. If accounting for non-
Western agency, struggle and change is at the heart of Becker Lorca’s
confrontation with Eurocentrism, others remain less optimistic. As
indicated above, for those writing within the tradition of Third World
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), the Eurocentric inheritance of
the discipline goes beyond individual practitioners and theories and
permeates its core concepts and argumentative structures. Writing within
this tradition, Anghie argued that the concept of sovereignty was forged
through the colonial encounter and that despite twists and turns
“imperialism is a constant” for the discipline.23 Furthermore, Nesiah, and
more recently Storr, have argued that territorial sovereignty and the juridical
mechanisms that reproduced this particular form of political authority, such
as the uti possidetis doctrine, are inherently Eurocentric, despite their
adoption by non-Western states and their occasional tactical deployment for
anti-imperialist purposes.24 Finally, Parfitt has recently placed the state, the
much revered subject of international law, at the center of her exposition of
the discipline’s Eurocentrism.25 Within this intellectual and political
tradition, it is not intellectual or professional but rather juridical histories
that can capture the extent of Eurocentrism in international law. Overall,
even though many TWAIL accounts conclude with upbeat notes about the
possibility of resistance and change, their overall orientation does not offer
21. Becker Lorca, supra note 19, at 1054.
22. Becker Lorca, supra note 20, at 134.
23. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 312
(2004).
24. Vasuki Nesiah, Placing International Law: White Spaces on a Map, 16(1) LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 1
(2003); Cait Storr,Denaturalising the Concept of Territory in International Law, in LOCATING NATURE:
MAKING AND UNMAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW (Julia Dehm & Usha Natarajan eds., forthcoming
2020).
25. “[V]iewing statehood and international personality from the perspective of the process of
international legal reproduction casts doubt on the idea that ‘sovereign statehood’ should be understood
as the apotheosis of collective emancipation for all human communities everywhere, as international
law encourages us to assume.” ROSE PARFITT, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
REPRODUCTION: INEQUALITY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, RESISTANCE 13 (2019).
5
Tzouvala: The Specter of Eurocentrism in International Legal History
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,
420 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 31:2
a comprehensive solution to Eurocentrism nor does it purport to do so. After
all, the problem is not primarily conceptualized as a distortion of the
historical record of the discipline, but rather as a very real, persisting
characteristic of the international legal order.
The two approaches summarized above represent a small part of the
debate. A decade ago, Martti Koskenniemi identified at least four different
methods for confronting Eurocentrism, even though he refrained from
elaborating on his own understanding of the term.26 These techniques
included hybrid histories that pluralize the origins of international law;27 a
critique of core concepts and of their colonial inheritance; comprehensive
studies of the relationship between international law and imperialism; and,
finally, the exoticization of both Europe and of European international law.
This exoticization will be achieved through a detailed study of the discipline
as a peculiar project of a very specific group of European liberals. For
Koskenniemi, this last approach is encapsulated by the purportedly anti-
Eurocentric Eurocentrism of The Gentle Civilizer of Nations.28
Ten years later, we can detect at least two more methods that have been
employed by legal scholars as responses to Eurocentrism. The first involves
the turn to global history offered by the Oxford Handbook of the History of
International Law.29 The other seeks to pluralize the notion of international
law itself by asserting, for example, the lawfulness of Indigenous or Islamic
law and resisting the tendency of European international law to expand its
jurisdiction over time, space and all aspects of life.30 Within this context, it
is appropriate to talk about “international laws” in the plural. According to
this line of thinking, there is no good reason to think about core legal
concepts, such as sovereignty, exclusively within the narrow, statist
constraints of European international law. Lawyers can (and should) look
at other juridical traditions that imagine and practice sovereignty in ways
26. Martti Koskenniemi, Histories of International Law: Dealing with Eurocentrism, 19
RECHTSGESCHICHTE 152, 171 (2011).
27. For some interventions that question the European Origins of international law see: Becker Lorca,
supra note 20; Liliana Obregon, Between Civilization and Barbarism: Creole Interventions, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE THIRD WORLD: RESHAPING JUSTICE (Richard Falk, Balakrishnan
Rajagopal and Jacqueline Stevens eds., 2008); Liliana Obregon, Creole Consciousness and
International Law in Nineteenth Century Latin America, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS
(Anne Orford ed., 2008); SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1996).
28. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001).
29. Fassbender, Peters, supra note 12. See also: Maria Adele Carrai, Current Chinese Approaches to a
Global History of International Law, 66 STORICA 23 (2016).
30. For such approaches emanating from settler colonies both by settler and indigenous scholars see:
Mark McMillan, Koowarta and the Rival Indigenous International: Our Place as Indigenous Peoples
in the International, 23 GRIFFITH L. REV. 110 (2013); Anne Orford, Ritual, Mediation and the
International Laws of the South, 16 GRIFFITH L. REV. 353 (2007); Amar Bhatia, The South of the North:
Building on Critical Approaches to International Law with Lessons from the Fourth World, 14 OR. REV.
OF INT’L L. 131 (2012); Ruth Buchanan, Jeffery G. Hewitt, Treaty Canoe, in INTERNATIONAL LAW’S
OBJECTS (Jessie Hohmann, Daniel Joyce eds., 2018).
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better equipped to deliver social and environmental justice.31
As noted earlier, the purpose of this section is not to arbitrate between
these different approaches but rather to draw out their diversity. Even
though it is both intellectually and politically possible to reconcile and
combine some of them, it is also clear that many are directly antithetical and
often take aim at each other as much as they do at the “mainstream” of the
discipline. As I have already indicated, this multiplicity of tactics is
anchored to unacknowledged differences about the nature and impact of
Eurocentrism in international legal history. In a recent interview with
Liliana Obregon, Koskenniemi registered his frustration with the
“blurriness” of the concept and the fact that seemingly entirely different
problems are summarized under this moniker.32 This observation captures,
in my view, only a minor part of the problem. To return to Laclau, talk of
Eurocentrism is not just “noise” nor does it mean “all things to all people”.
Rather, the process of signification is currently failing and occasionally
causes considerable frustration to people whose professional identity
revolves around the mastering of language and meaning. This is because
none of the approaches summarized above has managed to establish itself
as universal or objective. In the section that follows, I engage in detail with
the Marxist conceptualization of Eurocentrism and make the case for its
importance for international lawyers.
II. TOWARD A RADICAL CRITIQUE OF EUROCENTRISM FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW
This is not the first time that international legal historiography has been
plagued by a misleading sense of agreement that conceals fundamental
tensions. For example, implicit tensions about the meaning of imperialism,
the ways it interacts with international law, and whether it is still relevant
for international legal analysis have been constantly present during the “turn
to history” in international law. As James Gathii and Robert Knox have both
argued, “imperialism” has been mobilized to signify anything from a
narrow set of practices of direct political domination to a global system of
value extraction and exploitation.33 These different conceptualizations have
also led to starkly diverging positions in regard to international law. On the
one hand, “weak” critiques of empire have sought to salvage international
law and to reassert its universality against what they perceive to be its
31. Michael Fakhri, Third World Sovereignty, Indigenous Sovereignty, and Food Sovereignty: Living
with Sovereignty despite the Map, 9 TRANSNAT’L L. THEORY 1 (2018).
32. Liliana Obregon, Martti Koskenniemi’s Critique of Eurocentrism in International Law, in THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS: READING MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI 379 (Wouter Werner, Marieke de
Hoon & Alexis Galán eds., 2017)
33. James Thuo Gathii, International Law and Eurocentricity, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 184 (1998); Robert
Knox, A Critical Examination of the Concept of Imperialism in Marxist and Third World Approaches
to International Law (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis) (on file with the author).
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isolated perversions by the great powers. On the other, “strong” critiques
have focused on demonstrating international law’s repeated failures to live
up to its universalist promise because of its very intertwining with
imperialism.34
In many respects, contemporary disagreements over Eurocentrism
directly echo this earlier debate about imperialism. It is partly for this reason
that this section focuses on the work of the Third Worldist Marxist Samir
Amin. His work enables us to think through both problems at the same time.
Amin’s writings are important not only because it was him who introduced
the concept of Eurocentrism in the field of social inquiry, but also because
he did so in the process of discussing the historically concrete nature and
implications of Western imperialism. Before proceeding further, a
methodological clarification is required. Earlier in this essay I have framed
the problem of Eurocentrism in international law as one of empty signifiers,
of competing meanings that only become stabilized through struggle. This
choice renders certain arguments unavailable to me. My turn to Samir Amin
is, therefore, not an attempt to recover Eurocentrism’s authentic and, by
implication, authoritative meaning.35 Rather, Samir Amin’s articulation has
the advantage of providing a clear, explicit articulation of the problem as
well as of its possible solutions. Additionally, my return to Amin wants to
draw out the politics of the marked absence of his work from international
legal accounts of Eurocentrism. None of the works that I discussed above
engages with or even cites Amin. This absence carries with it a tendency to
turn Eurocentrism into a problem of culture and/or professional diversity
and to insulate it from a radical critique of the global political economy. In
this respect, revisiting Amin’s work can help us to push against efforts to
domesticate the radical potential of the critique of Eurocentrism and to
reduce it to liberal pluralism or to a politics of representation that does not
challenge the discursive or material structures of international law.
For now, let’s return to Amin: his work offers the tools for thinking about
Eurocentrism, imperialism and capitalism together. Amin’s political and
materialist treatment of Islamism and, more broadly, religious
fundamentalism is an important antidote to the rampant Islamophobia of
our political moment. It also offers useful tools of engagement that go
beyond liberal tolerance. His own radical critique emerged as part of his
effort to understand Eurocentrism as a phenomenon specific to capitalism,
34. The distinction between “weak” and “strong” critiques of imperialism is found in Gathii, supra note
33.
35. Peter E. Gordon calls this the “premise of origins”: the contextualist historian’s (implicit) assumption
that in order to properly grasp an idea we need to restore it to its origins. Gordon warns against the
potentially unpleasant normative consequences of this emphasis on origins, but at the very least this
return to the origins as somehow authoritative and authentic requires justification: Peter E. Gordon,
Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas, in RETHINKING MODERN EUROPEAN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 37-8 (Darrin M. McMahhon & Samuel Moyn eds., 2014)
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or, to paraphrase Fredric Jameson, as the cultural logic of expansionist
capitalism. Indeed, Amin’s treatment of Eurocentrism can only be
understood within the context of his Third Worldist Marxism. In his work,
he sought to understand the dynamics of capitalism as a fundamentally
global system of exploitation, and to make sense of his experience as a left-
wing radical who witnessed the resurgence of religious fundamentalism and
the essentialization of non-European cultures and peoples.36 Amin pushed
against this essentialization of culture and its discursive elevation into a
driver of conflict. In fact, he saw this culturalism as a core ideological
construction of global capitalism that legitimizes unequal development. To
do so, he assumed not only that Marx’s theory is not economistic but that it
is not a theory of economics at all: ‘Marx’s project is not an economics; it
is an historical materialism.’37 Rather, Amin argued, the main difference
between Marx and bourgeois economics was that Marx tried to comprehend
the historical specificity of capitalism as a mode of production that is
differentiated from other such modes. This is the case-Amin argued-
because generalized commodity exchange and commodity fetishism under
capitalism render the idea of a separate and independent “economy”
governed by its own laws thinkable and even self-evident in the first place.38
After all, Marx positioned his work not as yet another theory of political
economy, but as a critique of the whole enterprise. Simultaneously, juridical
ideology that posits workers and capitalists as free and equal enables the
function of capitalism, while simultaneously obscuring its exploitative
character.
Enter Samir Amin’s Third Worldism, which emphasizes the global
transfer of value and the tendency of capitalism to exacerbate imbalances
between the center and the peripheries of capitalist development.39 In this
context, the incorporation of an ever-increasing number of regions within
the circuits of capitalist production and exchange does not bring about
homogenization in terms of incomes, development, political or material
cultures. Instead, imperial linkages ensure the steady transfer of value from
the periphery to the center. Eurocentrism, Amin posits, emerged as a
historically specific ideological construction, one that re-read Europe’s
contingent, chaotic, and violent transition to capitalism as a story of always-
existing cultural and moral European supremacy.40 Within the Eurocentric
36. Eurocentrism first appeared in English in 1989 (it was published in French a year earlier). Its second,
updated edition appeared in 2009 and contains an extensive section on religion, capitalism, violence and
(anti)modernity taking stock of the post 9/11 developments. See Amin, supra note 9, at 57-86.
37. Id. at 87.
38. Id. at 86.
39. Id. at 154. See also: SAMIR AMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL
FORMATIONS OF PERIPHERAL CAPITALISM (1976); SAMIR AMIN, IMPERIALISM AND
UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1977).
40. The historicization of capitalism has been at the core of the Marxist critical project: Karl Marx, ‘The
Secret of Primitive Accumulation’ in CAPITAL VOL. 1: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1991);
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intellectual universe, Europe’s transition to capitalism and national-
statehood were imagined to be due to purely internal factors, a position not
unknown to certain strands of Marxism either.41 For the ideologists of
Western imperialism, Western prosperity and expansion was due to the
purportedly uniquely open and dynamic character of Christianity and/or
Western culture.42 The latter was, Samir argues, re-invented to encompass
civilizations, such as ancient Greece, that developed through their
interaction with the eastern Mediterranean, especially Egypt, and not with
any place that would later come to be associated with “the West”.43
Marx himself was not a stranger to these Eurocentric understandings of
the rise of capitalism, especially in his earlier writings. In some of his earlier
journalistic writings on India, ideas of “Oriental despotism” and its inherent
tendency toward stagnation still permeated his thought.44 The dissolution of
the “archaic” modes of production could also be brought about externally,
and British imperialism-despite its moral repugnancy-was precisely this
external force propelling the supposedly stationary East toward capitalism
and modernity. In a stark departure from such Eurocentric essentialization
of both East and West, Amin claimed that all cultures, and especially all
religions, are plastic and subject to constant interpretation and re-
interpretation to serve diverse political projects and material interests.45
Instead, for Eurocentric thinkers, Europe and subsequently, the West or the
“developed world,” are elevated into the position of unique and predestined
matrixes of rationality, modernity, tolerance or justice. Amin argued that
Islamic fundamentalism and other forms of culturalist reaction operate as
the mirror image of these Eurocentric fantasies. Such reactionaries accept
this self-designation of the West as the source of modernity only to assign
ELLEN MEISKINS WOOD, THE ORIGIN OF CAPITALISM: A LONGER VIEW (2017); SILVIA FEDERICI,
CALIBAN AND THE WITCH: WOMEN, THE BODY AND PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION (2004); ALEXANDER
ANIEVAS, KEREM NIŞANCIOĞLU, HOW THE WEST CAME TO RULE: THE GEOPOLITICAL ORIGINS OF
CAPITALISM (2015). For an application of the concept of “primitive accumulation” in international law,
see Mark Neocleous, International Law as Primitive Accumulation; Or, the Secret of Systematic
Colonization, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 941 (2012).
41. This is notably the position of the current known as political Marxism, especially Robert Brenner
and Ellen Meiksins Wood. For an account of the origins of legal extraterritoriality that draws from
political Marxism, see Maia Pal, Early Modern Extraterritoriality, Diplomacy and the Transition to
Capitalism in, THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF LAW: HISTORY, THEORY, POLITICS (Daniel S. Margolies
et al. eds., 2019). For the most comprehensive critique of this internalism within the field of international
relations, see Anievas & Nişancıoğlu, supra note 39.
42. On the global dissemination of the concept of culture as ‘a claim about the fundamental
underdetermination of human subjectivity,’ see Andrew Sartori, Culture as a Global Concept, in
BENGAL IN GLOBAL CONCEPT HISTORY: CULTURALISM IN THE AGE OF CAPITAL (2008).
43. Amin, supra note 9, at 166.
44. Marx’s writings on British colonialism in India serve as a good guideline on the gradual evolution
of his thought away from his early eurocentric assumptions, as do his late-life notes on the Iroquois.
August Nimtz, The Eurocentric Marx and Engels and Other Related Myths, in MARXISM, MODERNITY
AND POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES (Crystal Bartolovich & Neil Lazarus eds. 2002); THE ETHNOLOGICAL
NOTEBOOKS OF KARL MARX (Lawrence Krader ed., 1972).
45. Amin, supra note 9, at 162.
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negative connotations to this otherwise unchallenged Eurocentric narrative.
Instead of struggling against the material and ideological constructions that
perpetuate unequal development, these movements “are not different from
Eurocentric fundamentalism, which itself tends to take the form of Christian
neo-fundamentalism. On the contrary, they are only its reflection, its
negative complement.”46
The question that remains is what can international lawyers learn from
Samir Amin. Amin’s engagement with Edward Said provides an answer.
Even though Amin’s analysis drew heavily from the insights of
Orientalism, it also pushed back against what he saw as the lack of historic
specificity and a partial embrace of the West’s mythology about itself. Amin
cautioned against Said’s tendency to conflate Eurocentrism as a particular
form of universalism that arose along with European imperialism with other
forms of ethnic particularism or chauvinism. The latter, Amin argued,
predated capitalism and emerged from entirely different sets of social
relations:
During the Crusades, Christians and Muslims each believed
themselves to be the keepers of the superior religious faith, but . . .
neither was capable of imposing its global vision on the other. That is
why the judgments of the Christians, at the time of the Crusades, are
no more “Eurocentric” than those of Muslims are “Islamocentric”.
Dante relegated Mohammed to Hell, but this was not a sign of a
Eurocentric conception of the world, contrary to what Edward Said has
suggested. It is only a case of banal provincialism.47
Needless to say, this observation alone cannot provide satisfactory
answers to all of the problems of international legal historiography.
Nevertheless, it offers a useful guideline for thinking through the historical
specificity of Western international law and its universalization. Take for
example Anghie’s famous formulation that international law has been
animated by a certain “dynamics of difference” since the times of the
conquest of the Americas.48 This observation has since informed a rich
tradition of postcolonial critiques of international law.49 The problem,
46. Id. at 204.
47. Id. at 153-54.
48. Anghie, supra note 23, at 3.
49. Amongst many: Vasuki Nesiah, From Berlin to Bonn to Baghdad: A Space of Infinite Justice, 17
HARV. HUM. RTS J. 75 (2004); SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW:
DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY (2011); Usha Natarajan,
Creating and Recreating Iraq: Legacies of the Mandate System in Contemporary Understandings of
Third World Sovereignty, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 799 (2011); Luis Eslava & Sundhya Pahuja, Between
Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of International Law, 3 TRADE, L., DEV. 103
(2011); Adil Hasan Khan, International Lawyers in the Aftermath of Disasters: Inheriting from
Radhabinod Pal and Upendra Baxi, 37 THIRD WORLD Q. 2061 (2016); KATE MILES, THE ORIGINS OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: EMPIRE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF CAPITAL
(2013); Kathryn Greenman, Aliens in Latin America: Intervention, Arbitration and State Responsibility
for Rebels, 31 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 617 (2018).
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however, is that, at an appropriately abstract level, the “dynamics of
difference” can be used to explain not only this specific legal system, but
pretty much every other legal system as well. In other words, we need
intellectual and conceptual tools that will enable us to grasp the differences
between the Eurocentric international law of the 19th century and the
Sinocentric worldview and law of the same period. Notions of “barbarity”
and “civility” or “Othering” and hierarchy are insufficient guides since both
systems revolved around such notions. Rather, if we want to capture both
the historical specificity of 19th-century international law and the reasons
for its unprecedented success and global spread, we would benefit from an
inquiry into the relationship between this particular form of legality and the
rise and global (but unequal) spread of capitalism.
This framework enables us to concentrate on the specific discursive
function and material operation of core concepts, such as the “civilization”.
For if the notion was present in other legal systems too, it was in the context
of 19th-century international law in particular that it was used to authorize,
amongst other things, extensive extraterritorial jurisdiction and the
comprehensive administrative, political, and economic reform of ‘semi-
civilized’ polities along the lines of capitalist modernity.50 Furthermore, it
was at this point when difference came to be understood in strict biological
terms pertaining to sexual and racial difference.51 In other words,
international law made the distribution of rights and duties dependent both
on things as mundane as the promulgation of commercial law codes and the
appointment of independent judges and as metaphysical as the grandeur of
the “white race”. It is within this conundrum that the Eurocentricity of
modern international law unfolds. Of course, this example is not exhaustive
of the international law’s Eurocentrism. At the same time, as Amin pointed
out, Eurocentrism is an indispensable part of the hegemonic ideology of
global capitalism, which however is not reducible to Eurocentrism:
The dominant ideology and culture of capitalism cannot be solely
reduced to Eurocentrism. It is only one dimension of the prevailing
ideology, though one that has developed like an invasive cancer
suppressing the essential force, that is to say, economism, in the hidden
recesses of the corpulent body it has produced.52
50. On 19th-century extraterritoriality and its links to comprehensive internal reform in the semi-
periphery see: Richard S. Horowitz, International Law and State Transformation in China, Siam, and
the Ottoman Empire during the Nineteenth Century 14 J. OF WORLD HIST. 455 (2004); Mai Taha,
Drinking Water by the Sea: Real and Unreal Property in the Mixed Courts of Egypt, in THE
EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF LAW, supra note 41; Ntina Tzouvala, “And the laws are rude, . . . crude and
uncertain”: Extraterritoriality and the Emergence of Territorialised Statehood in Siam, in THE
EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF LAW, supra note 41.
51. I have further explore the links between the standard of civilization and capitalism in Ntina Tzouvala,
‘Civilisation’ in Jean d’Aspremont, CONCEPTS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTRIBUTIONS TO
DISCIPLINARY THOUGHT (Sahib Singh ed., 2019).
52. Amin, supra note 9, at 177.
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Therefore, an ideology critique of international law that focuses
exclusively on its (undeniable) Eurocentrism runs the risk of
exceptionalizing it and ultimately abstracting it from the thick and
contradictory nexuses of power and ideas within which it operates. In the
next section, I will show the conceptual and historiographical problems that
arise when the critique of Eurocentrism is vacated from all its radical
connotations while at the same time absorbing all other critiques of the
discipline of international law and its histories. I will also explore the
problems that arise when historiographical differences are fought in the
terrain of Eurocentrism, especially when the term is loosely or improperly
understood.
III. EUROCENTRISM AS REGIONALISM: OR, ON THE PECULIAR A-
HISTORICISM OF HUNTER’S HISTORY
Allow me to return to Ian Hunter’s attack against Anghie’s path-breaking
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law as
articulated in his 2010 piece “Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics”.53
Despite the fact that this piece initiated the ongoing and bitter debate about
anachronism between international lawyers and legal historians,54 his
objections to Anghie’s postcolonial history of international law are more
explicitly focused on the latter’s purported Eurocentrism. Hunter’s
argument focuses particularly on the inclusion of jurists like Vitoria in
Anghie’s critical history of the discipline and goes as follows: Imperialism,
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law is representative of
critical histories of international law, not only in the sense of being skeptical
about international law’s virtues, but also “in the philosophico-historical
sense positing norms that project a history of what jus naturae et gentium
should have been or could have become, as opposed to a history of what it
contingently happened to be.”55 This involves-Hunter’s argument goes-
evaluating jus gentium against “a global principle of justice capable of
including European and non-European peoples within the ‘universal
history’ of its unfolding.”56 Unfortunately, all such available theories are
profoundly Eurocentric. They originated in Europe as responses to concrete
political struggles of their time. As a result, both jus gentium and its critics
53. Supra note 3.
54. The literature is voluminous and growing. SeeOrford, supra note 3; Anne Orford, International Law
and the Limits of History, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS, supra note 32.; Anne Orford, On
International Legal Method, 1 LONDON REV. INT’L L. 166 (2013); Lauren Benton, Beyond
Anachronism: Histories of International Law and Global Legal Politics, 21 J. HIST. INT’L L. 7 (2019);
Kate Purcell, On the Uses and Advantages of Genealogy for International Law, 33 LEIDEN J INT’L L. 13
(2020).
55. Hunter, supra note 3, at 11.
56. Id. at 11-12.
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are “regional to and within Europe”.57
The cultures, philosophies, and life-worlds with which jus gentium
collided were no less regional and particularistic. As a consequence, there
is no transcendental principle—Hunter contends-—that can help us
evaluate the encounter between these radically different moral, political,
and legal orders. Citing the Japanese international lawyer Onuma Yasuaki,
Hunter then concludes that we ought to understand the history of
international law as one of clashing regional orders. The Islamocentric
siyar, the Sinocentric tribute system, and the Eurocentric law of nations are
placed side by side as equally regional and particular legal systems, in a
move that according to Hunter produces “powerful relativizing effects.”58
To summarize: for Hunter the only non-Eurocentric way of approaching jus
gentium involves placing it in its proper time and space. This
contextualizing move should also apply to all legal systems, which were
equally regional and particularistic. Any other modes of intellectual
engagement involves necessarily a moral evaluation, which can only ever
be Eurocentric. In fact, Hunter offers an exhaustive catalogue of the
standards available to critical histories: Catholic universalism, Kantian
cosmopolitanism, or Heidegerian metaphysics.59
Hunter’s argument suffers from multiple problems, some of which have
already been discussed at length by other scholars. For example, Orford has
argued that Hunter’s pronouncement that jus gentium had absolutely
nothing to do with 19-century imperialist international law is historically
incorrect. As both Orford and (indirectly) Anghie have pointed out,
Vitoria’s writings were retrieved by the liberal US lawyer James Brown
Scott to justify non-territorial forms of US empire through the language of
universalism, humanity, and free trade.60 Furthermore, Hunter’s assertion
that the encounter between different legal systems led to their
“uncontrollable” clash because of their fundamental incommensurability
and the absence of an overarching system that could arbitrate amongst them
is difficult to sustain in the light of the historical record.61 Both in Aotearoa
57. Id. at 12.
58. Id. at 16. The excerpt quoted by Hunter reads as follows: “What is critical is the question of the
scope of a society in which a certain normative system is valid and applied. Whether ‘ ancient
international law,’ the Islamocentric siyar, the Sinocentric tribute system or Eurocentric law of nations,
they are nothing other than regional normative systems which were applied in only a limited area of the
earth and lasted for a limited period of time.” Onuma Yasuaki, When Was the Law of International
Society Born? An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilisational Perspective, 2
J. HIST. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2000).
59. Id. at 14.
60. “It is fitting that the entrance of the US Department of Justice displays a likeness of Scott in the
guide of Vitoria, because it is the version of Vitoria created by Scott that would provide the ideological
justification for the universal law of the American century.”Orford, supra note 3, at 17.
61. “ [B]y presuming the existence of a universal form of justice-disagreeing only over whether Vitoria
had discovered it or not-critics and defenders both ignore the possibility that the immensely destructive
imposition of this European moral anthropology on indigenous cultures was the uncontrollable
consequence of a clash between disparate civilizational cultures.”Hunter, supra note 3, at 18.
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New Zealand and elsewhere, full-scale colonization was preceded by
Europeans living amongst Indigenous populations, following the latter’s
law, or devising new ways of managing their juridico-political encounters.62
This leads me to one of the most pressing problems with Hunter’s overall
argument and conception of Eurocentrism. Competing regional systems that
have incorporated divergent cosmologies, conceptions of the good life, and
metaphysical assumptions have co-existed for a very long time and have
accommodated each other in various ways. These encounters have not
always been peaceful or free of imposition, hegemony, or exploitation.
However, following Samir Amin’s thought, I argue that there is a crucial
difference between the co-existence and clashes between these regional
legal orders and modern international law. The latter harbored the ambition
and to a large extent succeeded in colonizing the globe as well as diverse
aspects of social, political, and economic life.63 In the course of a couple of
centuries, ancient empires and civilizations had to abandon or at least
radically modify the ways in which they arranged their inter-polity affairs
and adopt the technologies and vocabulary of (European) international
law.64 Even when confronting Western imperialism, non-European elites
and even ordinary people began to do so from within the categories of this
new international order. Following Amin, I posit that what requires
explanation and also marks contemporary international law as Eurocentric
is not the trite observation that its origins have been European or the fact
that its “fathers” thought it was somehow superior. Rather, what is both
peculiar and historically unique is that this particular, regional, and in many
respects rather strange and dysfunctional legal system managed to establish
itself as a universal language, as the arbiter of disputes as diverse as
territorial claims over the South China Sea, the importation of beef raised
with synthetic hormones in the European Union, or the availability of the
institution of marriage to same-sex couples in Costa Rica. Hunter’s attempt
62. For an account of these encounters in the Pacific, see MATT K. MATSUDA, PACIFIC WORLDS: A
HISTORY OF SEAS, PEOPLES AND CULTURES (2012).
63. No victory is ever final or complete, as evidenced by the survival of Indigenous legal systems around
the globe. See SHIRI PASTERNAK, GROUNDED AUTHORITY: THE ALGONQUINS OF BARRIER LAKE
AGAINST THE STATE (2017); HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND
SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI’I (1999); Irene Watson, There is No Possibility of Rights without Law: So Until
Then, Don’t Thumb Print or Sign Anything!, 5 INDIGENOUS L. BULL. 4 (2000); Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik
Stark, Nenabohzo’s Smart Berries: Rethinking Tribal Sovereignty and Responsibility, 2013 MICH.
STATE L. REV. 339 (2014).
64. Non-Western lawyers quickly adapted to the new demands and became highly competent and
creative users of this new language, which they deployed both against Western imperialism and in order
to further their own imperial and other hegemonic projects. For some examples: Liliana Obregon,
Completing Civilization: Creole Consciousness and International Law in Nineteenth-Century Latin
America, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS, supra note 27; Becker Lorca, supra note 20;
Mohamad Shahabuddin, The “Standard of Civilization” in International Law: Intellectual Perspectives
from Pre-war Japan, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. (2019); Maria Adele Carrai, Learning Western Techniques
of Empire: Republican China and the New Legal Framework for Managing Tibet, 30 LEIDEN J. INT’L
L. 801 (2017).
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to present both jus gentium and Māori law as two equally particularistic and
regional legal systems avoids the question of how come it is the former but
not the latter that is being taught to law students around the world and that
it is concepts of universal humanity and its discontents that are still being
put to motion in order to justify the projection of legal authority in our
formally post-colonial world.65
Here, I suggest that we need to conceptualize international law’s
Eurocentrism not in reference to where it originated from or even what it
says, but it terms of what it does in the world, the way in which it has
intervened and shaped material relations of power. Drawing from Amin, I
argue that international law has been one important link in the long chain of
discourses and practices that have mystified the contingent and violent
origins of capitalism in Europe, have posited recent developments such as
the centralized state as expressions of the inherent rationality and
superiority of European culture, and have demanded their universalization.
In this respect, Anghie’s engagement with jus gentium in particular and
international law in general is open to criticism, but for very different
reasons than those assumed by Hunter and other contextualist historians. As
we saw above, Hunter argues that Anghie’s argument that a “dynamics of
difference” has been the animating feature of European international law is
Eurocentric because of the intellectual debt of such a formulation to Martin
Heidegger.66 This objection is in line with Hunter’s (and other contextualist
historians’) broader aversion toward the (explicit) theorization of history.67
Another, more fruitful and sustainable, way of engaging with Anghie’s
formulation would be to seek to understand the historical specificity of this
“dynamics of difference” in ways that both deepen and diverge from his
own analysis. This call for historical specificity is necessitated by two main
reasons. First, European international law’s historically unique and
unprecedented success, as summarized above, requires some explanation
lest we slide toward theories about inherent European superiority. Secondly,
left unelaborated the “dynamics of difference” can describe most-if not all-
legal systems that have existed across space and time. The truly interesting
65. One could object to this retrieval altogether and argue that engaging with it in its own terms involves
dignifying bad history. Orford, however, has persuasively responded that this argument involves a
rejection of the jurisprudential method as a whole and a refusal to engage with the ways legal scholars
and institutions make meaning move across space and time. See Orford, supra note 3, at 2.
66. “Finally, basing itself on Heideggerian metaphysics and ‘deconstruction,’ postcolonial critique of
‘European law’ has developed an elaborate metaphorics of colonization as the imposition of a European
‘self’ on a colonized ‘other.’ Colonization is thus treated as if it were the project of constructing a
repressive yet anxious European identity—’The colonizer constructs himself as he constructs the
colony’—that is destined to be undone through the self-manifesting ‘Being’ of the colonized ‘other.’”
Hunter, supra note 3, at 14.
67. Hunter explicitly articulated his objections to the theorization of history and to the epistemological
argument that we can only access reality (past and present) through theoretical schemes that allow us to
order what would otherwise be unrecognizable amalgamation of data in Ian Hunter, The Contest over
Context in Intellectual History, 58 HIST. & THEORY 185 (2019).
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and challenging question is what specific differences (and similarities) were
invented, reified, or glossed over in the process of the colonial encounter
and how did European international law specifically deal with these
differences. After all, despite postcolonial theorists’ emphasis on ‘othering’
as a rhetorical device to justify subjugation, international law has struck a
precarious balance between “othering” and the erasure and assimilation of
difference as a way of engaging with and subjugating the peripheries.
Consider, for instance, the “standard of civilisation” which has been
central to critical histories of international law.68 Anghie’s contention that
‘‘the civilising mission was animated by . . . the question of ‘cultural
difference’”69 brackets the fact that people from different regions,
backgrounds, and economic systems had been encountering each other for
millennia without resorting to this particular legal standard. An additional
problem emerges if we consider the fact that the idea of culture and cultural
difference has been itself a 19th-century invention.70 Therefore, the idea of
a pre-existing and transparent understanding of “cultural difference” being
managed through this standard is somewhat unconvincing. Rather, what
was distinctive about the standard of civilization was the specific
differences that were understood to be of significance and the possibility,
desirability and methods for overcoming such perceived differences. I have
argued elsewhere that the standard of civilization in international law
performed two crucial moves. First, it turned difference into a matter of
biology and secondly, it singled out the social, legal, and political
institutions associated with capitalist modernity in the West and
transformed them into preconditions for the achievement of “civilized”
status.71 The development of private law, the protection of human freedom
as individual liberty, the separation of powers, and the development of a
centralized, bureaucratic state that controls its territory through the usage of
police, prisons, and asylums were considered definite markers of
“civilization” in the context of international laws and institutions. As a
consequence, a series of juridical techniques ranging from the so-called
“unequal treaties” to mechanisms of international supervision, such as the
Mandate System of the League of Nations, were put in place in order to
implement, monitor and evaluate reforms undertaken by non-Western states
68. For some examples, see Anthony Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance
in Historical Perspective, 45 VILL. L. REV. 887 (2000); David P. Fidler, The Return of the Standard of
Civilization, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 137 (2001); Anghie, supra note 23; Obregon, supra note 27; Shahabuddin,
supra note 67; Ntina Tzouvala, Civilisation, in CONCEPTS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 51.
69. Anghie, supra note 23, at 3.
70. “We find discourses of culture emerging to prominence in the German-speaking world during the
second half of the eighteenth century; in the English-speaking world starting in the first half of the
nineteenth century; in Eastern Europe, East Asia, and South Asia starting in the second half of the
nineteenth century; and just about everywhere else in the course of the twentieth century.” Sartori, supra
note 42, at 5.
71. See NTINA TZOUVALA, CAPITALISM AS CIVILISATION: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2020).
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in this direction.72 This was a Eurocentric legal standard in two ways. First,
it was Eurocentric insofar as it elevated into transcendental and supposedly
timeless legal standards the contingent historical developments linked to the
particularities of early European capitalism. Secondly, it was Eurocentric
because in so doing it was legitimizing and further promoting European
hegemony and the interests of European capital. The grounding of
difference on purportedly biological realities justified European
expansionism and the subjugation of colonized peoples as being a literal
force of nature that neither could or should be contained. The liberal
international lawyer John Westlake captured the disciplinary position when
he proclaimed, “The inflow of the white race cannot be stopped where there
is land to cultivate, ore to be mined, commerce to be developed, sport to
enjoy, curiosity to be satisfied.”73 European expansionism and military
superiority were de-linked from their social origins and attributed to the
inherent quality of the white race and/or Christian/European civilization. At
the same time, by demanding that other polities adopt the institutions of
capitalist modernity the ‘standard of civilization’ demanded that the whole
world was reconfigured after the image of the European ruling classes and
to their benefit.74 The “standard of civilization” was Eurocentric not because
it embodied European chauvinism and even less so because it originated in
Europe, even though both are obviously part of its legacy. Rather, it was
Eurocentric because of its world-making aspirations and effects. By
describing the (legal) world as divided between civilized, semi-civilized
and uncivilized states the “standard of civilization” assisted in the
construction of a new, global hegemony: that of European capital.
CONCLUSION
In this essay I argued that every historiographical debate, including
72. On the history of “unequal treaties,” see Matthew Craven, What Happened to Unequal Treaties?
The Continuities of Informal Empire, 74 NORDIC J. OF INT’L L. 335 (2005). On these “unequal treaties”
as tools of state-making, see Richard S. Horowitz, International Law and State Formation in China,
Siam and the Ottoman Empire during the 19th Century, 15 J. WORLD HIST. 445 (2004); TURAN
KAYAOĞLU, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: SOVEREIGNTY AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN JAPAN, THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND CHINA (2014); Tzouvala, supra note 49. On the Mandate System as a method
of limited internationalization of this ‘civilizing’ mission, see Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth
of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations,
34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 513 (2001-2002); Nele Matz, Civilization and the Mandate System under
the League of Nations as Origin of Trusteeship, 9 MAX PLANCK U.N. Y.B. 47 (2005).
73. JOHN WESTLAKE, Territorial Sovereignty, Especially with Relation to Uncivilised Regions, in THE
COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 131, 145 (1914).
74. The Communist Manifesto contains a brief reference to “civilization” that hints at its world-making
qualities: “The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the
immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into
civilisation. . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production;
it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois
themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.” KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS,
THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 39 (Samuel Moore trans., Pluto Press 2008).
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apparent historiographical and terminological confusion, has a politics. This
politics is essentially antagonistic, even when it remains implicit and
insufficiently articulated. Therefore, my effort to clarify the international
legal debate around Eurocentrism was itself a way of illuminating the
existence of a political struggle and intervening in it. My retrieval of Samir
Amin’s intervention sought to anchor the disciplinary critique of
Eurocentrism to a critique of capitalism and of unequal capitalist
development.75
I suspect that this move will be attractive to different audiences for
different reasons. First, I intend to offer to my fellow Marxist international
lawyers the intellectual tools for intervening in the debate about
Eurocentrism in international law with renewed confidence and to
encourage them to take the challenge of Eurocentrism seriously. By
pointing at the radical, materialist origins of the concept I am hoping to
ignite more reflections about the relationship between the cultural and the
material in international law and its history. Secondly, I am aiming to stir
postcolonial, critical, and left legal scholars toward a better appreciation of
the role of capitalism as a structuring force in the history of international
law, and vice versa. Such a move should enable us to better comprehend the
historical specificity of modern imperialism (and its law) and to resist
attempts to subvert, domesticate, and appropriate critical international legal
histories. For example, thinking about international law, imperialism and
capitalism together allows us to distinguish between radical critiques of
imperialism (that seek to dismantle it) and critiques that seek to improve the
relative position of national ruling classes in the Global South. The collapse
of the radical potential of decolonization and the transformation of Third
World sovereignty in a tool of protecting local autocrats and not a means of
remaking the world points at the urgent need for making such distinctions.76
Thirdly, I am hoping that my analysis will be of consequence to all those
working on the history and historiography of international law. Indeed, my
analysis should have at the very least succeeded in showing that the
prevailing confusion is the outcome of a political struggle, but also of the
relative ease with which lawyers adopt radical vocabularies without
necessarily being willing to commit to radical projects or to even openly
engage with the intellectual traditions that birthed such concepts.
Incidentally, I am hoping that this re-articulation of the debate about
75. Rahul Rao has also used the concept of unequal development as well as the traditions of Third
Worldism and black Marxism to reconcile the tensions between (orthodox) Marxism and postcolonial
theory. Rahul Rao, Recovering Reparative Readings of Postcolonialism and Marxism, 43 CRITICAL
SOCIOLOGY 587 (2016).
76. Adom Getachew has chronicled the transformation of Third World sovereignty from a tool
mobilized by revolutionary postcolonial leaders in order to remake the international (legal) order along
more equitable lines to a shield used by Third World autocrats who repress and exploit their own people.
ADOM GETACHEW, WORLD-MAKING AFTER EMPIRE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SELF-DETERMINATION
(2019).
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Eurocentrism will force some explicitness about everyone’s theoretical and
political commitments and assumptions.
One final note remains. Debates about Eurocentrism in international law
and beyond are often accompanied by a sense of frustration and entrapment.
If Eurocentrism is, in fact, prevalent, it is not evident that we can detect and
critique it, let alone undo it, since our concepts, values, and methods are
always already Eurocentric.77 Drawing from the work of the philosopher
Amia Srinivasan I want to suggest a different approach to this problem, one
that acknowledges the generative potential of this impossibility of escaping
Eurocentrism.78 Using the example of the feminist legal theorist Catherine
MacKinnon, Srinivasan theorizes that certain genealogies become
potentially world-making precisely by establishing their own impossibility.
Radical feminism, for example, is a riddle, a paradox that cannot be solved
quite yet. This is because ‘“[m]ale power not only constitutes reality, but
moreover makes itself the standard of reality: to see things objectively is to
see things as men see them. Thus to genealogize the world as a product of
male power is already to worldmake.”79 Indeed, Srinivasan argues, radical
feminism with all its world-making potential of overthrowing the patriarchy
comes into being precisely by recognizing its own impossibility as it names
the totality of male power.80
The same applies, I argue, to Eurocentrism. In this paper I have suggested
that we need a more precise understanding of this problem, one that links it
to the globalization of the capitalist mode of production. This approach
narrows the scope of the debate, but it simultaneously deepens its
implications: with capitalism triumphant on a global scale, how are we to
undo its influence on international law? Along with Srinivasan, I posit that
if we are to understand ours as being a world-making project, one that seeks
to both describe the world and in so doing to transform it, then posing this
question is a good place to start. The success of this experiment is, of course,
“beholden to the future.”81
77. ”It was only much later that I came to realize that the Latin Americans were as Eurocentric as their
European colleagues. Though they were arguing regionalist exceptionalism they were trying to position
themselves through a Eurocentric discourse and tools, and they didn’t want to be marginal. . . . So, is it
possible to NOT be Eurocentric, without being completely marginalized from the field?’” Obregon,
supra note 32, at 377-78. “Eurocentrism was more like the Alien that had entered inside you, it was part
of the very vocabularies that enabled you to think about those other problems. The question was, then,
whether it was at all possible to exorcise it, to get rid of it.” Id.
78. Amia Srinivasan, Genealogy, Epistemology and Worldmaking, 116 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN
SOC’Y 127 (2019).
79. Id. at 149.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 146.
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